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more moved to do what is right if he is given a paramount 
right to custody. To permit the trial judge to ascertain 
first that the child will be legitimated before awarding cus-
tody to the father and, in the absence of such action, to award 
custody to another qualified person would more nearly achieve 
that objective. Otherwise the trial judge must award custody 
to the father without assurance that the child will be legiti-
mated or, according to the alternative suggestion, may declare 
the father unfit if legitimation is not accomplished, despite 
the fact that the only hindrance may be the failure of his 
wife to consent. 
The trial court found that the best interests of the children 
will be served by giving their custody to Frieda Howes. The 
appeal being on the judgment roll, it must be presumed 
that the evidence supports that determination. If upon a 
future application it should be shown that the children's 
interests would be better served because of a change in con-
ditions of whieh legitimation of the children may be one, a 
different order may be made. But upon the present record, 
I would affirm the order of the trial court. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22321. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1954.] 
THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
[1] 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TELEPHONE CORPORA-
TION (a Corporation), Defendant and Appellant. 
Telegraphs and Telepho~e -Franchises-Privileges Granted 
by State-Acceptance.- y 1905 amendment of Civ. Code, 
§ 536 (now Pub. Util. C de, § 7901), the state offers to tele-
phone corporations a franchise to construct lines along or 
on any public road or highway, and franchise is accepted when 
such a corporation constructs its lines on public road or high-
way and maintains and operates a telephone system. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 7; Am.Jur., Tele-
graphs and Telephones, § 28. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 10; 
[2, 7, 8] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 11; [3, 4, 9-13] Telegraphs 
and Telephones, § 12; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1346; [6] In-
junctions, § 109 ( 5). 
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[2] !d.-Franchises-Local Franchises.-When a telephone cor-
poration obtains a franchise under Civ. Code, § 536 (now Pub. 
Uti!. Code, § 7901), it need not obtain a franchise from local 
authorities. 
[3) !d.-Franchises- Effect of Broughton Act.-The Broughton 
Act (Stats. 1905, p. 777, formerly Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
2720, now Pub. Uti!. Code, §§ 6001-6017), unlike Civ. Code, 
§ 536, does not grant any right of privilege, nor does it pur-
port to empower or authorize boards of supervisors to grant 
franchises or other privileges, but instead indicates an intent 
to limit and restrict powers which may have been granted 
under other laws by specifying procedure which must be illl-
posed in granting of franchises by subordinate legislatiye 
bodies. 
[4] !d.-Franchises- Effect of Broughton Act.-Where former 
Civ. Code, § 536, did not give telephone company a franchise to 
use public streets within city, and under city charter the com-
pany was required to obtain franchise from city for use of 
such streets, the Broughton Act, requiring franchise holder to 
pay municipality 2 per cent of gross annual receipts arising 
from franchise, was applicable. 
[5] Appeal-Law of Case-Questions Concluded.-Where judg-
ment for city in its action against telephone company for 
injilll.ciion restraining company from using public streets with-
out obtaining a new franchise from city (the former franchise 
having expired) was affirmed on prior appeal, city is foreclosed 
from challenging conditions attached to issuance of injunction, 
and terms of judgment calling for payment for use of streets, 
pending determination of appeal, according to cornpany's actual 
obligation as fixed by terms of expired franchise and not ac-
cording to previous practice of company, are controlling 
whether or not company misconceived its obligation under 
ordinance during years former franchise was in effect. 
[61 Injunctions-Appeal-Suspending Injunction--Trial Court.-
Trial court may protect the parties on appeal by providing 
that its injunction or order is stayed, under conditions that 
protect appellant by preserving subject matter of appeal pend-
ing· outcome thereof and at same time protect respondent by 
saving to it benefits of judgment in event of an affirrnance. 
[7a-7d] Telegraphs and Telephones- Franchises- Local I'ran-
chises.-Where city ordinance fixes compensation for telephone 
company's franchise to maintain and operate poles and wires 
on public streets at 2 per cent of company's gross receipts 
"arising from the use of such franchise" (following language 
of Broughton Act, § 3), the amount of gross receipts from 
company's exchange service on which to apply such formula 
is not limited to amount actually collected within franchise 
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area but includes entire receipts from local calling area, since 
receipts from exchange service represent a charge to subscriber 
for use of all company's property within local area and amount 
collected by company from any particular subscriber is not 
attributable solely to that subscriber's telephone but is attribu-
table to all of equipment within calling area; and in allocating 
receipts between franchise area and remainder of local calling 
area an apportionment based on relative investment rather 
than on mileage more appropriately measures gross receipts 
attributable to various parts of local calling area, where con-
ditions throughout area are not uniform. 
[8a-8d] !d.-Franchises-Local Franchises.--To determine amount 
of intrastate toll revenue of telephone company attributable 
to city under city ordinance fixing compensation for com-
pany's franchise to maintain and operate poles and wires on 
public streets at 2 per cent of company's gross receipts arising 
from the use of such franchise, the computatior" may begin 
by taking company's total toll receipts in the state and then 
determining city's share thereof by using ratio of total invest-
ment of company in toll plant within the state to its invest-
ment in toll plant within city. 
[9] !d.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.--In applying the 
Broughton Act it is necessary to determine what proportion 
of total annual gross receipts of public utility should be justly 
accredited to its distribution system over various rights of 
way, as distinguished from its power plants or other producing 
agencies; this principle applies in case of a telephone com-
pany, as well as an electric company, since powerhouse of 
electric company and central plant of telephone company are 
essential to operations of each, and neither would have any 
gross receipts if it had only its central plant and no other 
means of reaching its customers than by use of public streets. 
[10] !d.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.-The payment re-
quired under Broughton Act is based on gross receipts of 
utility "arising from its usc, operation or possession" of fran-
chise, and gross receipts of a utility, such as a telephone com-
pany, arise from all of its operative property and not ex-
clusively from any one part thereof; hence a franchise, in 
common with other operative property, contributes to total 
gross receipts. 
[11] !d.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.-The words of 
Broughton Act referring. to receipts arising from use of fran-
chise rather than to receipts arising from use of all of property 
indicate that an apportionment is to be made, and city may 
not properly compute amount due it for telephone company's 
use of franchise as if statute read that grantee shall pay pro-
portion of 2 per cent of its entit·e gross receipts attributable 
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to franchise area which number of miles covered by franchise 
granted bears to total number of miles in franchise area. 
[12a-12d] !d.-Franchises-Effect of Act.-A reason-
able method for apportionment of gross receipts between dis-
tributing system and other property of telephone 
company is to allocate gross receipts by ratio that company's 
investment in its distributing system in area bears to its total 
investment in plant therein, it being reasonable to assume that 
there is a relationship between value of property and amount 
that it earns; an allocation made on a linear basis is not 
feasible because powerhouses, office buildings and the like can-
not be measured by the mile. 
[13a, 13b] !d.-Franchises-Effect of Broughton Act.--The final 
step in determining amount of gross receipts arising from 
telephone company's use of public streets within city is to 
apportion gross receipts attributable to distributing system 
between parts thereof on public and private rights of way, 
and an apportionment based on relative investment in such 
parts of distributing system is appropriate where extent or 
value of distributing system over a given right of way may 
indicate its earning capacity. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. L. N. Turrentine, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action to determine compeJ;J.sation due city for telephone 
company's use of franchise to maintain and operate poles 
and wires on public streets. Judgment determining amount 
of compensation, reversed with directions. 
J. F. DuPaul, City Attorney, Shelley J. Higgins, Assistant 
City Attorney and 'f. B. Cosgrove for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
John A. Sutro, Francis N. Marshall, Noble K. Gregory, 
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Oscar Lawler, Leslie C. Tupper 
and Lawler, Pelix & Hall for Defendant and Appellant. 
\Valter C. Pox, ,Jr., and Chickering & Gregory, as Amici 
Cnriae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
'rRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff city of San Diego by Ordinance 
No. 5681 granted defendant Southern California Telephone 
Company1 a franchise to construct, maintain, and operate 
1Since entry of judgment defendant company has been merged into 
its parent corporation, the Pacific 'relephone and 'I'elegraph Corporation. 
'£he change of corporate identity is not material to the issues of this case. 
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a system of telephone poles and wires upon the public streets 
of the city for a period of 30 years from August 7, 1914. 
When the franchise expired in 1944, the company assumed 
that under section 536 of the Civil Code (now Pub. Util. 
Code, § 7901) it had the right to use the streets without a 
franchise, and therefore did not seek a new franchise. The 
city brought suit to enjoin the company from using its streets. 
On May 23, 1946, the superior court entered judgment de-
claring that the company was committing a public nuisance 
in using the public streets within so much of the city as was in-
cluded within its boundaries on March 19, 1905, the day before 
section 536 was amended to apply to telephone corporations. 
(We refer to this area, as do the parties, as the Old City.) 
The judgment ordered the company within 30 days after the 
judgment became final to abate the nuisance and enjoined it 
from occupying the public streets within the Old City. The 
judgment provided, however, that if within 30 days after 
the judgment became final the company applied for a new 
franchise and paid for the use of the public streets in the 
Old City since August 7, 1944, the order to abate and the 
injunction would not take effect, unless and until the company 
failed to accept a new franchise or the city refused to grant 
it. Both parties appealed, and the judgment was affirmed. 
(City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 92 Cal.App. 
2d 793 [208 P.2d 27].) Upon the going down of the re-
mittitur, the company, on October 4, 1949, within the time 
allowed, applied for a new franchise to use the public streets 
within the Old City. 
The present controversy is over the amount that the com-
pany must pay the city for use of the public streets of the 
Old City between August 7, 1944, the date the franchise ex-
pired, and September 1, 1949, the first day of the calendar 
month preceding its application for a new franchise. The 
parties concede that their rights are governed by the terms 
of the 1946 judgment. 'fhe relevant part thereof provides 
that the company shall pay the city "that sum of money de-
termined by applying the rate at which compensation for the 
franchise and privilege of such use >vas fixed by Ordinance 
No. 5681 of said city to the period from and including August 
8, 1944 to, but not including, the first day of the calendar 
month immediately preceding the filing of such application." 
Ordinance 5681 fixed such compensation at "two per cent of 
the gross annual receipts of such grantee and his or its suc-
cessors or assigns arising from the use, operation or possession 
Jan. 1954] CITY OF SAN Dmao v. SouTHERN ETC. TEL. CoR!'. 11 ,) 
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of said franchise.'' During the 30 years the franchise '"as in 
effect, the company computed the amount due under the orcli-
nance by a method that, according to the city, would result 
in a payment of $421,435.68, if applied during the period in 
question. 
The trial court concluded that under the provision of the 
1946 judgment quoted in the preceding paragraph, the 
amount due was $239,337.23. Both parties appeal. 'fhe city 
contends that the injunction was stayed on the condition 
that in the interim the previous method of computation would 
be continued and that the city is therefore entitled to $421,-
435.68. If that contention is not sustained, the city contends 
that $333,541.14 is nevertheless due under the 1946 judgment. 
The company contends that properly computed a payment of 
only $158,670.03 is required. It has paid that amount to 
the city.2 \Ve have concluded that the applicable decisions 
and principles of law sustain the company's method of com-
putation and that the judgment appealed from must therefore 
be reversed. 
With minor exceptions the parties are in agreement as to 
the facts. The controversy is over the application of the 
1946 judgment to those facts. 'fhe following factual and 
legal background is material in passing on the respective con-
tentions of the parties. 
The company operates a state-wide and interstate com-
munication system. :B'or tariff purposes its service is divided 
into toll service and local or exchange service. Toll service 
permits a subscriber to call an exchange outside his local 
calling area, e. g., from San Diego to Los Angeles over the 
lines of defendant company or from San Diego to New York 
by use of a connecting system. A toll charge is made for each 
toll call. Exchange service is generally charged for at a flat 
or minimum monthly rate without a special charge for each 
call. Exchange areas are established by the Public Utilities 
Commission and the boundaries thereof do not necessarily 
follow political boundaries. Extended area service is an ex-
panded exchange service whereby a subscriber may call 
several exchanges without payment of a toll charge. The 
San Diego extended area, which is over 40 miles long and 
nearly 30 miles wide, includes most of the city of San Diego, 
2 Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is for $80,667.20 (the 
difference between $239.337.23 and $158,670.03) with interest from 
October 4, 1949 (the date the new franchise was applied for) of 
$11,293.40, or a total of $91,960.60. 
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all of the cities of Coronado, National City, La Mesa, El 
Cajon, Chula Vista, and several other communities, numerous 
military establishments, and a large unincorporated area. 
Most of the Old City is within the San Diego extended area; 
a small part is within the Del Mar exchange, which is not 
within the extended area. 
'l'he company provides its service by a complicated system 
of facilities. There are telephone instruments and drop wires 
upon the subscribers' premises; a network of poles, wires, 
cables and conduits partly upon public streets and partly 
upon private rights of way, referred to as "outside plant"; 
central offices with the equipment that makes and unmakes 
connections between telephone instruments; and offices and 
equipment in which engineering, accounting, billing, and ad-
ministrative activities are performed. Of these facilities, only 
a part of the outside plant occupies public streets; the re-
mainder is on private property. 
In 1905 the Legislature amended section 536 of the Civil 
Code (now Pub. Util. Code, § 7901) to apply to telephone 
corporations.3 By that amendment the state offers to tele-
phone corporations a franchise to construct lines along or 
upon any public road or highway. [1] The franchise is 
accepted when such a corporation constructs its lines on the 
public road or highway and maintains and operates a tele-
phone system. (County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. 
Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 382 [196 P.2d 773] .) [2] When a tele-
phone corporation obtains a franchise under section 536, it 
need not obtain a franchise from local authorities. (City 
of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., supra, 92 Cal.App.2d 
793, 808.) At the same 1905 session the Legislature enacted 
the Broughton Act. ( Stats. 1905, p. 777; formerly 1 Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, Act 2720, now Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6001-
6017.) This act operates in a different field from that covered 
by section 536. [3] ''The Broughton Act, unlike section 
536, does not grant any right or privilege, nor does it purport 
to empower or authorize boards of supervisors to grant fran-
chises or other privileges, but instead indicates an intent to 
limit and restrict the powers which may have been granted 
"Section 536 was amended to read: ''Telegraph or telephone corpora-
tions may construct lines of telegraph or telephone lines along and upon 
any public road or highway, along or across any of the waters or lands 
within this State, and may erect poles, posts, piers, or abutments for 
supporting the insulators, wires, and other necessary fixtures of their 
lines, in such manner and at such points as not to incommode the public 
use of the road or highway or interrupt the navigation of the waters.'' 
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n,nder other Ia~s py sp~uifying the procedure whie}l m11st 
be impot;!ed in the gra:p.ting of an;r franchises by. subordinate 
legislative bodies." ( Cirttnty of Los Angeles v. Sout7tern Cal. 
'l)l .. Co.~. supra, 3:2 (Jal.2d at 3:83.) . [41 In, the p~evious 
appeal i:p. . t1:te. present . case, . was . determirie.d that s~ctio;n 
536 did .II.ot give the collipap.y a franchise t~ use the pu1J1ic 
streets within the Old City and that under the city ch.~l't~r 
the .company required to obtain a 'franchise from, di~ 
city .. for the use of such streets. . ( Oity of Sa;n Diego y, 
Soutker'fl; (JaZ .. Tel. Co., supra1 92. Cal.App.2d at 803J 805,) 
In 1914,when Ordinance No. 5681 was adopted, the C~a,r· 
ter of the City of San Diego did, provide a proeedul'e 
for the ~granting. of such a :franchise to.telephone. ,co!rlpa,nies. 
The ... Broughton Act is.therefore applicable.,. SeetioJ1,th~ee'()f 
that act.· provides that the pay-ment by the. holder. of th~ ft~tl­
chise. to . the • county . . . municipality •. granthlg .. the fra;nchi~e 
shalfbe "t'\V() p~r eent(2%) of the ~rosa an;q.ual receipts of 
theJ}ers()n, partnership or corp~rati0n to whom the fr,anchise 
is a~ar(led, arising :Ero:~p it~ use, opera.tion o;r posse~~iont' 
(Now Pn,h. Util. Code, ~ 6006J. Ordinance M8lof the city • 
of San ;Dieg? follows · tlie language of section .. three of . the 
Broughton Act. . .. ·· . . . ...... ·•. . •. · . , . .· . . . . .. · 
Tht;tt ·seetion was iid:erpr.eted by this court in County '~f 
Tu.ltJ,re v. (Jity ~tf dinuba .. (~922), 188. Cal. 664 [206 • P, 1>833, 
in;volving a .wsp11te ?ver the amount of paymentS t() be ll1~de 
by- 8.11 (:}lectriecmnpany to a l?ity. and a county under ~rou.ght~n 
Act; franchises: ',!'he. complmy;. contended. that section' thr~~ 
was void for indefiniteness. . This court held the. aet .v~Iid, 
aft~r .11· careful analysis of its language and the probletfis 
it.tvolved. . 
The court first pointed o1lt.thati'The ~ross receipts o~ t)11s 
def~11<1ant .. f1.ccrue from. two . disti11ct •. age1tcies, .. One · .. iS 'tb,e 
g,e~era~ing plants. Ol'. power~houses .. Qf. t;ne ·. company,. 1Q~aled 
it}-tln:ee separa,te c?unties; the otli~r is th~ distributi~g sy$tell),, 
coJ:J.sisting. of poles .a:P.d wires extending tl'lrpughoTit the ~b:ree 
counties,· :partly · .. upon and over· streets ... and highway~·.·. ~JJ.<i 
cover,(:)~ ... by va~ious county a11d .· mu!ticipal J~a11chise~, ·. 'a;nd .. 
parply over private easements own,e<l by; the ~omlfany~ 1~ 
(.188 Cal. at 6'nt). Brout'htort .Act, the court etn1tin,tted, 
appii~s only to gr?ss re<;eipts "ari~h:~g" froifi thE! uuse, 
?Per~tion.o~ po~se~sion of. the f~~n~h¥>e." The. payment J~r 
~'.1\red. ''is not a. ta:i upon. the. propertr of the eorpo;ra,tiop., 
11?~ a ·license cha:rl$'e. fp~ the.. ~rivilege of pJ;lef~ti~g i,ts. J>l!~k 
ness. It is a compensation for the use of the portions ·of tll.e 
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highway covered by the franchise easement, and it is limited 
to such percentage of the total gross receipts as can be shown 
to have arisen from the use of the franchise." ( 188 Cal. at 
67 4.) 'rhe court prescribed a two-step apportionment for 
determining that percentage. The first step is to determine 
"what proportion of the total annual gross receipts of the 
public utility should be justly accredited to its distributing 
system over various rights of way, as distinguished from its 
power plants or other producing agencies." ( 188 Cal. at 681.) 
This apportionment ''will establish the fund from which the 
percentage of earnings 'arising from the use, operation or 
possession' of the various franchise easements shall be ascer-
tained." ( 188 Cal. at 681.) The second step is to apportion 
the receipts attributable to the distributing system between 
the public and private parts thereof. The court rejected the 
contention that this apportionment should be based on the 
amount of revenues collected within each county or munici-
pality ( 188 Cal. at 678-679), and concluded that ordinarily 
an allocation on a mileage basis would be preferable, ''not 
necessarily as an exclusive method of distribution of the 
gross receipts, but as a practicable one where the contribution 
of the various franchise easements to the gross earnings can-
not be otherwise determined.'' ( 188 Cal. at 681.) 
The Tulare case was followed in Monrovia v. Southern 
Counties Gas Co., 111 Cal.App. 659 [296 P. 117], and Ocean 
Park Pier Amusement Corp. v. Santa Monica, 40 Cal.App.2d 
76 [104 P.2d 668, 879]. In the Monrovia case the utility had 
paid to the various counties and municipalities for Broughton 
Act franchises an amount estimated on the basis of the total 
mileage in each county or municipality, eliminating that part 
of the utility's earnings attributable to the use of its prop-
erties located on private property. The city of Monrovia, 
however, did not accept this allocation and contended that it 
should be paid 2 per cent of the gross receipts from the sale 
of gas within its boundaries. The trial court adopted the 
city's theory. The appellate court reversed, on the ground 
that under thr Tulare case an apportionment should be made 
between receipts attributable to the use of the franchise and 
receipts attributable to other property of the utility. Similarly, 
in the Ocean Park case a wharf franchise followed the word-
ing of the Broughton Act. Part of the wharf was on private 
land and part on city property. The court reversed a judg-
ment awarding the city 2 per cent of the total receipts from 
the pier~ hold,illg that under the Tulare case the city could 
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not collect for the occupancy of property not owned by the 
city. 
A.t the outset, the city contends that interpretation of the 
1946 judgment does not turn on application of the Broughton 
Act or Ordinance No. 5681 to the facts of this case. It 
contends that the trial court stayed execution of the 1946 
judgment on the condition that the status quo be maintained 
pending outcome of the appeal and that the status quo to be 
maintained was ''the last actual peaceable, uncontested status 
which preceded the pending controversy," namely, the status 
that existed for 30 years preceding August 8, 1944. Under 
any other interpretation, the argument continues, the stay 
would have been beyond the power of the trial court. The 
city then contends that maintenance of the status quo com-
pelled continued application of the method of accounting 
used by the company between 1914 and 1944 under the 
expired franchise, and that the amount due by that method 
is $421,435.68. 
The trial court, ho·wever, did not issue an injunction and 
thereafter stay its effect pending appeal. Instead, it pro-
vided that the injunction would not take effect until 30 days 
after the judgment became final. Until that time, there was 
nothing to be stayed. Even after the 30-day period, the 
injunction took effect only if the company had failed within 
that period to apply for a new franchise and pay for use of 
the public streets during the interim period, or if it sub-
sequently failed to accept a new franchise or the city refused 
to grant it. 
[5] Since the judgment was affirmed on the previous 
appeal, the city is foreclosed from challenging the conditions 
attached to issuance of the injunction. It bears noting, how-
ever, that a conditional injunction was appropriate to this 
litigation. It is true that after the former franchise expired 
the company no longer had permission from the city to usr 
the streets. (Of. Village of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397. 
402 [207 P.2d 1025].) It is also true that the trial court 
did not have the power to grant the company a new franchise: 
it was the responsibility of the city, under its charter, to 
determine whether the company should receive a new fran-
chise. (Sunset Tel. &; Tel. Co. v. Pasadena, 161 Cal. 265, 285 
[118 P. 796] .) Nevertheless, the question to be determined in 
the previous trial and appeal was whether the company needed 
a new franchise. The company conducted that litigation in good 
faith and was partly successful. Aside from the rights of 
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the company, it was in the interest that the 
trial court withhold issuance of an injunction and thus 
assure continued telephone service pending outcome of the 
appeal. (See State v. Misso~tri Standard Tel. Co., 337 Mo. 
642, 656 [85 S.W.2d 613].) Accordingly, the trial court in 
the exercise of its discretion as a court of equity could delay 
the taking effect of its injunction and allow the company to 
use the streets until it was finally determined whether it 
was required to obtain a franchise. The requirement that 
the company continue to pay the amount due under its prior 
obligation adequately protected the city in the interim. 
Moreover, even if the action of the trial court were viewed 
as a stay of an injunction that had previously issued, the 
terms of the judgment do not support the city's contention. 
'fhe judgment provided that the company should pay ''that 
sum of money determined by applying the rate at which com-
pensation for the franchise and privilege of such use was 
fixed by Ordinance No. 5681 of said City." It did not pro-
vide that payment should be computed according to the previ-
ous practice of the company; it called for payment according 
to the company's actual obligation as fixed by the terms of 
the expired franchise. The terms of the judgment are there-
fore controlling, whether or not the company misconceived 
its obligation under the ordinance during the years the fran-
chise was in effect. The judgment did not give either the city 
or the company more or less rights in the interim than either 
had had under the expired franchise. 
[6] The city contends that the trial court did not have 
power to stay its injunction unless it required the company 
to continue to use the same method of accounting that had 
been used in computing payments under the expired fran-
chise. A trial court is not so limited. It may protect the 
parties on appeal by providing that its injunction or order 
is stayed, under conditions that protect the appellant by 
preserving the subject matter of the appeal pending outcome 
thereof and at the same time protect the respondent by sav-
ing to it the benefits of the judgment in the event of an 
affirmance. (Tnlare bT. Dist. v. Sttperior Conrt, 197 Cal. 
649, 669 [242 P. 725] ; see, also, City of Pasadena v. Superior 
Cotw't, 157 Cal. 781, 795 [109 P. 620, 21 Ann.Cas. 1355] .) 
The terms of the expired franchise were an adequate standard 
for determination of the amount that the company should 
pay the city. 
The determinative question on this appeal is thus the cor-
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rect of the ordinance. The ordinance fixed 
the amount that the company should pay the city at 2 per 
cent of the gross receipts " from the use" of the fran-
the of section three of the Broughton 
Act. The controlling what part of the company's 
should be taken as from the use of the 
from the use of the public streets within the 
To ansvver this we must (1) determine 
are to be ascertained ; ( 2) 
between the company's producing 
property, and its distribut-
which is on property and partly on 
public property; and (3) apportion the receipts attributable to 
the distributing between private and public rights 
of way.4 
( 1) Gross of the company from its telephone oper-
ations arise from two sources: its exchange service and its 
intrastate5 toll charges. \Ve will first consider the problem 
of determining the amount of gross receipts from exchange 
service. The amount collected from the extended area during 
the period in question was $27,724,579.76, and from the Del 
Mar exchange $116,896.63. The amount collected from sta-
tions and equipment within the Old City from the two local 
calling areas was The trial court and the com-
pany agree that the total receipts from the exchange area 
must be apportioned between the Old City and the remainder 
of the local calling area; they differ, however, on the method 
of allocation to be used. The trial court made its apportion-
ment by using the ratio of the mileage of the distributing 
on public streets in the extended area to the mileage 
on public property on the Old thereof. The com-
pany used the ratio of the amount invested in plant within 
the two areas. The , the same method as did the 
company during the term of the expired franchise, contends 
that an of the entire receipts from the local 
area is unnecessary, and that the amount of gross 
upon which to the Broughton Act is the amount 
aetually collected within the franehise area, the Old City. 
'1rrlJC' data used in the foHo\vrjup; di:-wu:..,;;;on ~Jre frou1 tlJe eomoanv records 
kept pursuant to a nnifmm of accounting presc;ibed by th~ 
California Public Utilities tl1e Fodeml Communications Com-
mission, and regulatory bodies of the several states. 
"The Broughton Act does not apply to interstate business of the com-
pany. (Broughton Act, § l; now Pub. Uti!. Code, § 6001.) 
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[7a] We have concluded that the city's contention cannot 
be sustained. Receipts from exchange service represent a 
charge to the subscriber for use of all the company's prop-
erty within the local area, since for a fiat monthly charge 
he can call any subscriber therein. The amount collected 
by the company from any particular subscriber is not attrib-
utable solely to that subscriber's telephone; it is attributable 
to all of the equipment within the calling area. Receipts 
collected within the Old City are partly earned by the com-
pany's facilities in the remainder of the calling area and 
the converse is equally true. 
It is therefore necessary to determine the Old City's share 
of the total amounts received from exchange service. If con-
ditions throughout the area were uniform, an apportionment 
on the basis of mileage would be satisfactory. In the present 
case, however, an apportionment based on relative investment 
more appropriately measures the gross receipts attributable 
to the various parts of the local calling area, for there is more 
outside plant per mile of right of way in the heavily congested 
urban area comprising the Old City. It is reasonable to 
assume that the franchise area contributes more to the pro-
duction of revenue per mile of right-of-way than does the 
more remote nonfranchise area. 
[Sa] The next problem is to determine the amount of intra-
state toll revenue attributable to the Old City. The trial court 
did not take toll revenues into account. The company, how-
ever, uses the public streets of the Old City in earning its 
revenue from toll calls and some of that revenue thus neces-
sarily arises "from the use, operation or possession" of the 
franchise and comes within the Broughton .Act. The city, 
following the method used by the company during the ex-
pired franchise, computes the amount of toll revenue attrib-
utable to gross receipts by ascertaining the amount of toll 
revenue originating within the Old City and allocating 20 
per cent thereof to the Old City. No explanation is made 
to justify the use of the figure of 20 per cent. The company, 
on the other hand, begins its computation with its total toll 
receipts in the state. It determines the Old City's share 
thereof by using the ratio of the total investment of the com-
pany in toll plant within the state to its investment in toll 
plant within the Old City. 
Clearly, it would be impossible to compute with complete 
accuracy the Old City's share of each of the thousands of toll 
calls originating or terminating therein, for a separate calcu-
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Iation would have to be made for each call. An approxima-
tion must be made and, in our opinion, the company's method 
is practicable .and allocates to the Old City its fair share of 
toll receipts. 
(2) The next step in determining the amount of gross re-
ceipts arising from the use of the franchise is to apportion 
the gross receipts arising within the Old City between the 
company's producing plant and its distributing system. The 
city does not make this apportionment in its computation. 
[9] As pointed out in the Tulare case, however, in applying 
the Broughton Act it is necessary to determine "what pro-
portion of the total annual gross receipts of the public utility 
should be justly accredited to its distributing system over 
various rights of way, as distinguished from its power plants 
or other producing agencies." (County of Tnlare v. City 
of Dinuba, supra, 188 Cal. 664, 681.) 
The city contends that the 'l'ulare case is not applicable 
here, on the ground that it involved an electric company that 
manufactured its product in one locality and distributed it 
in another, and that both factors contribute to the total gross 
receipts, whereas the receipts of a telephone company arise 
solely from its communication service and no revenues could 
be obtained without use of the city streets. The proposed 
distinction is untenable. A person buys electric service just 
as he buys telephone service. In the one case electric power 
supplies heat, light, and energy; in the other, spoken words 
are converted into electric impulses and back again to spoken 
words. The powerhouse of an electric company and the 
central plant of a telephone company are essential to the 
operations of each; neither would have any gross receipts if 
it had only its central plant and no other means of reaching 
its customers than by use of the public streets. 
It is therefore apparent that the apportionment between 
the distributing system and the remainder of the company's 
plant must be made in the present case unless we overrule 
the Tulare case and disapprove the Ocean Park and Monrovia 
cases. We have reexamined those cases and have concluded 
that they were correctly decided. 
[10] The payment required under the Broughton Act is 
based on the gross receipts of the utility "arising from its 
use, operation or possession" of the franchise. It is a familiar 
concept in public utility legislation and regulation that the 
gross receipts of a utility arise from all of its operative prop-
erty and not exclusively from any one part thereof. (See 
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present case the 
property of the company, contributes to its total gross receipts. 
[11] The words of the to receipts 
arising from use of the franchise rather tb~:m to receipt& 
arising from the use of of the indicate that 
an apportionment 1ras to be made. would com-
pute the amount due under the act as if it "the 
shall pay the proportion of two per cent of its entire gross 
receipts attributable to the franchise area which the number 
of miles covered the franchise bears to the total 
number of miles in the franchise area.'' The act does not 
admit of that construction. 
[12a] It is necessary, to determine how to appor-
tion gross between and the 
other opl'rative property of the company. In our opinion, 
a reasonable methocl is to allocate gross receipts by the ratio 
that the company's investment in its 
the area bears to its total investment in 
category of the eompany 's conl ributes to its total 
gross receipts. As in rate making, it is reasonable to assume 
that there. is a relationship behNeen the value of the prop-
erty and the amount that it earns. no other method 
of apportionment is since invested value is the only 
common factor between the distributing and the other 
operative property that fairly refieets the relative contribu-
tion of each category of property to the company's earnings. 
'l1he city contends that an allocation could be made on a 
linear basis but, that method is not feasible, for 
powerhouses, office buildings, and the like cannot be measured 
by the mile. 
[13a] (3) 'l'he final the amount of 
gross receipts arising from use of the public 
streets within the Old the gross receipts 
attributable to the between the parts 
thereof on public ancl of way. 
In the Tulare case, the court stated that ordinarily the 
apportionment should be made according to the ratio that 
the mileage of the distributing system on public rights of 
way bore to the entire mileage of the distributing system 
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within the area. 'I'he court however, that "There 
be instances ~wlHTe the extent or value of the distributing 
over a of way may indicate its earning 
... In such cases these conditions should be taken 
into account." ( Tulare v. of Dinuba, supra, 
188 Cal. 682.) based on relative in-
of the distributing system was 
the Tulare litigation. 
87 Cal.App. 744, 748 
in gross receipts 
and the remainder of the extended area 
ancl the Del Mar a ratio based on relative invest-
ment should be nsed. so that the Old City will be allocated 
it<s fair share of gro::;s As between different parts 
of tlw within the Old City, a ratio based 
on relatiye investment would likewise apportion receipts 
and of way. 
of the discussion, we consider the 
the city, the trial court, 
and the company. 
method The city con-
tends that if the amount dne nnder the 1946 judgment is to be 
the onl the company owes it $33,541.14. 
the eompr~ny 
ibe Old City :mr1 
r·eccipts from caJls 
nrec1 ont. 
follows : The total mileage 
is 562.44 miles, 
or 79.35 per is on public prop-
company collected from sta-
Old City are $21,017,085.16. 
between public and private 
allocating to the former 
or $16,677,057.07. 'rwo 
6 as the company's gross 
service receipts actually col-
from stations and equipment within 
thereto 20 prr cent of toll service 
~within the Old City. As previ-
r:annot he in this 
mrthod is also erroneous in that 
and doe,.; not allocate any 
to the distributing system 
to the use of the company's 
has erred in apportioning other 
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receipts between the public and private parts of the com-
pany's distributing system by use of a mileage ratio instead 
of a relative investment ratio. 
[8c, 12c] The trial couJ"t's rnethod of compntation: The trial 
court concluded that the amount due under the 1946 judg-
ment was $239,337.23. It arrived at that figure as follows: 
The mileage of the distributing system on public streets in 
the San Diego extended area is 1,026.2146 miles, of which 
442.8827 miles, or 43.15 per cent, is on public property in 
the Old City. The gross receipts of the company in the 
extended area during the period in question were $27,724,-
579.76. Of that amount 43.15 per cent, or $11,963,156.17, 
is apportioned to use of the public streets in the franchise 
area. Two per cent of that amount is $239,263.12. The same 
formula applied to that part of the Old City within the Del 
Mar exchange gives $74.11, which added to the preceding 
fig·ure makes a total of $239,337.23. The trial court did not 
take toll receipts into account. 
The trial court thus made the same error as did the city 
in failing to allocate any of the company's receipts to its 
powerhouses, office buildings, and other property not subject 
to any franchise charge. The trial court disregarded toll 
calls, although the company used the public streets in obtain-
ing toll revenue. [7c] The trial court used a mileage ratio in 
making its apportionment between total receipts in the ex-
tended area and the receipts attributable to the Old City, 
although, as we have seen, a ratio based on relative invest-
ment is appropriate to the present case. [13b] Finally, the 
trial court did not take into account the fact that part of the 
company's distribution system is on private rights of way. 
Had it done so, its ratio would have been the ratio of outside 
plant on public streets in the Old City, 442.882 miles, to out-
flicle plant on public and private rights of way in the extended 
area, 1,409.573 miles, or 31.42 per cent. 
[7d, 8d, 12d] The company's rnethocl of comptltation: The 
eompany contendfl that the amount due under the 1946 judg-
ment is $158,670.03. It arrives at that flgure as follows: The 
total investment in plant in the San Diego extended area 
"According to the company, the correct figure is 1,029.314 miles. If 
that mileage were used, the amount due under the trial court's method 
would be $238,672.08. 
7 'fhe city's figure of 446.297 miles in the Old City is the total of 
442.882 miles in the extended area, 0.795 miles in the Del Mar exchange, 
and 2.62 miles attributed to toll plant. 
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(excluding the part allocated to toll use) is $26,916,709, of 
which $5,238,777, or 19.46 per cent, is invested in outside 
plant on public streets in the Old City. For a sample period, 
January 1 to August 31, 1949, the gross receipts from the 
extended area were $5,076,394.89. Of that amount, 19.46 
per cent is $987,866.45, the amount of gross receipts attrib-
utable to the use of the streets in the Old City. The same 
formula applied to the Del Mar exchange gives $57.78. The 
company applies the same method to toll receipts from the 
entire state, which results in $177,973.65 attributable to the 
Old City. The total gross receipts from the three sources 
of gross receipts attributable to the use of streets in the 
Old City is $1,165,897 .88. Two per cent of that amount 
is $23,317.96, the amount due for 1949. Applying the same 
method to the other years results in the company's total of 
$158,670.03. 
Under the views expressed in this opinion, the company 
applied correct legal principles in its computation. It used 
a ratio based on relative investment in each of the three steps 
necessary to determine the amount of gross receipts arising 
from use of the public streets within the Old City: (1) ascer-
taining the Old City's share of receipts for local service within 
the extended area and the Del Mar exchange, and of intrastate 
toll charges; (2) ascertaining the distributing system's share 
of the amount attributable to the Old City; and ( 3) ascertain-
ing the franchise's share of the amount attributable to the 
distributing· system. 
The company has requested that this court direct the trial 
court to enter judgment in its favor. Some of the data used 
by the company in arriving at its computation, however, have 
not been found to be true by the trial court. We have used 
these data in this opinion to illustrate application of the 
legal principles herein discussed but, of course, we cannot 
deny the city an opportunity to challenge the accuracy and 
completeness of the company's figures in the trial court. 
The judgment is reversed for further proceedings in con-
formity with the views expressed in this opinion. The city 
shall bear the costs of this appeaL 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., Schauer, ,J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
judgment of reversal, but do not agree with the reasoning 
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ad vaneed the 
should be rendered in 
It is my considered JS a 
departure from the rule established in the Dinuba case 
(County of 'Tulare v. 188 Cal. 66,1 [206 P. 
983]), in that it seeks the investment 
method of limitations. 
'l'he same general I enunciated in my 
dissent in the Southern Counties Gas case ( of Los 
Angeles v. Southern Co1tnties p. 129 [266 
P.2c1 27]) should be the instant ease, since 
in both cases the mtmici the franchise is 
entitled to 2 per cent of the gross annual arising 
from the "use, " of the franchise. 
'rhere are, hoiYe~ver, a few in to telephone 
revenues which arc not present in cases involving gas and 
electric companies. One such has to do with the 
apportionment of toll It is true that part of the 
tolls collected in an area arc for communication services ren-
dered in other areas, "Where the message is transmitted and 
received; however, inasmuch as messages are also sent into 
and received in the local area without any revenues being 
collected there it would seem that the factors would balance 
each other out. Thus, all local tolls collected 
in an area to the gross of that area, >Ye are giving 
credit for some senices rendered elsewhere; but this is counter-
balanced by the fact that an of toll calls 
are probably transmitted or received 
any increase to its gross 
In the case at bar the gross receipts toll receipts) 
collected by the telephone company within the extended area 
should be used as the in our formula. 'l'hese 
gross receipts shou1d be between the distribution 
system and other production facilities) so 
as to ascertain the of gross attributable 
to the entire distribution These gross receipts of 
the entire distribution should then be apportioned 
between the public and private franchises on a mileage basis. 
Since 43.15 per cent of the in the extended area is 
on public property vvithin the Old 43.15 per cent of 
the entire distribution should be allocated to the 
fund from which the 2 per eent is to be taken. 
For these reasons, and those given in my dissent in the 
Southern Counties Gas case, post, p. 129 [266 P.2d 27], 
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I feel it would be a grave error to follow the formula estab-
lished by the majority. Such a formula is not consistent 
with the Dinuba case nor with the best interests of the general 
public. 
Plaintiff and appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied 
.B'ebruary 17, 1954. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22570. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1954.] 
COUN'rY OF I10S ANGELES, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN 
COUNTIES GAS COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a 
Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Franchises-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Gross 
receipts of gas company which was granted franchise by county 
to lay its pipes in public roads and highways arise from all 
of its operative property, whether or not such property is 
located on rights of way, public or private, or on land owned 
or leased by it or on land owned by others. 
[2] !d.-Charges and Percentages- Operative Property.-Oper-
ative property of gas company which was granted franchise 
by county to lay its pipes in public roads and highways con-
sists of various kinds of real and personal property, including 
land leased or owned, compressor stations and equipment, 
meter stations and equipment, gas production equipment, pipe 
lines, valves, general office buildings, warehouses, transporta-
tion equipment, laboratory equipment, etc. 
[3] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.-
Since the 2 per cent charge due county for franchise granted 
gas company by county ordinance pursuant to the Broughton 
Act (Stats. 1905, p. 777; now Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6001-6071) 
applies only to gross receipts arising· from use of franchise, 
gross receipts arising from operative property other than fran-
chise must be excluded from base to which the 2 per cent 
charge applies. 
[ 4] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Since every 
dollar invested in operative property of franchise holder earns 
an equal part of gross receipts, such receipts are attributable 
to a particular item or class of operative property according to 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.), Franchises, § 14a. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12] Franchises, § 21. 
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